She never managed a cent – yet she was fined by the Dutch financial regulator

When does a finfluencer become liable for someone else’s breach under Dutch law, and what does this mean for businesses that work with finfluencers?

The Dutch Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM) has fined a finfluencer who never managed a single cent of investors’ money. J. van den Brink used her website and Instagram to bring investors to Grinta Invest, a firm that managed client assets without a licence and disappeared with their money in 2021. The AFM fined Van den Brink €195,000 in 2024 and made the decision public on 5 November 2026. The Rotterdam District Court has since reduced the fine to €142,500 but otherwise upheld the decision; an appeal is pending.[1]

The case raises a question that goes well beyond Grinta: when can a finfluencer who promotes a financial product be held responsible for a breach committed by someone else, and what does that mean for businesses that engage finfluencers? This article examines that question under Dutch law, as enforced by the AFM as the Dutch supervisory authority; the position in other EU member states may differ. The question carries particular weight in the crypto market. On 6 November 2026, the AFM pointed out that a crypto-asset can be created within minutes, but that anyone offering one to the public must comply with the EU Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MiCAR).[2] Anyone launching a new token needs reach – and reach is exactly what finfluencers offer.

Promotion is not the same as co-perpetration

A finfluencer who is paid to advertise a financial business does not thereby breach the rules that apply to that business. Under Dutch administrative law, the finfluencer only becomes an offender in their own right if they co-perpetrate the breach (in Dutch: medeplegen).[3] Established case law requires close and deliberate cooperation in which the co-perpetrator’s contribution carries sufficient weight, with all circumstances considered together.[4] The co-perpetrator must know what the business is doing, but need not know that this requires a licence.[5]

The AFM draws the same distinction. By its own account, its finding was not based merely on the fact that Van den Brink wrote about Grinta, posted a sign-up link or received commission, but on her conduct as a whole.[6] The proceedings show that the line is far from self-evident. In 2024, the interim relief judge was not yet convinced that co-perpetration had been established: Grinta had already been in breach before Van den Brink became involved, and she had played no leading or directing role. The District Court upheld the AFM’s finding but reduced the fine, partly because it had taken the AFM some time to make clear that it regarded Van den Brink as a co-perpetrator.[7]

Even without co-perpetration, promotion is not unregulated. The Dutch rules on unfair commercial practices also apply to anyone acting in the name of or on behalf of a business, and paid promotion that is not recognisable as advertising may be misleading.[8] Consumers who suffer loss as a result may claim damages on that basis.[9]

What tipped the balance in the Grinta-invest case?

Grinta managed investors’ assets without a licence: its trading robot invested their money in CFDs on exchange rates – financial instruments for which a licence is required in the Netherlands.[10] Van den Brink had no access to investors’ money and no say in the trades. The AFM based its finding of co-perpetration on three elements.[11]

The first was a fixed arrangement. Under an agreement with Grinta, Van den Brink undertook to use her best efforts to recruit investors, with a minimum of five investors every twelve months. The second was the way she carried out that arrangement. She regularly published promotional content, answered questions from individual investors and allayed their doubts, acted as a point of contact for Grinta and served as a sign-up channel. According to the AFM, it was practically impossible to sign up without an intermediary. The third was knowledge. Van den Brink knew that Grinta traded independently with Dutch investors’ money and that it had no licence; she herself described Grinta as ‘unregulated’.

The fee played a part, but was not decisive. Grinta paid Van den Brink 10% of every deposit plus a share of the returns, around €195,000 in total. The AFM did not treat this commission as a separate ground for co-perpetration.[12] The amount she earned did, however, determine the level of the fine.

And in the crypto market?

The same question arises in crypto, but MiCAR places its obligations on the offeror. Anyone offering a crypto-asset such as a memecoin to the public must be a legal entity and, in most cases, must draw up a white paper, notify it to the competent authority – in the Netherlands, the AFM – at least 20 working days before publication, and then publish it. Unlike a prospectus, a white paper is not approved in advance.[13] Until a required white paper has been published, no marketing communications may be disseminated. Marketing communications must be clearly identifiable as such, fair, clear and not misleading, and consistent with the white paper, and must state that the offeror is solely responsible for their content.[14] Whatever a finfluencer posts about a token on the offeror’s behalf is therefore the offeror’s responsibility.

Among other exemptions, the white paper requirement does not apply to offers made to fewer than 150 persons per member state acting on their own account, or to offers worth no more than €1 million over twelve months; the legal entity requirement and the marketing rules still apply. These exemptions fall away as soon as the offeror, or a person acting on its behalf, announces an intention to seek admission to trading. According to the European Commission, this refers to a trading platform operated by a service provider established in the EU.[15] A paid finfluencer who announces such a listing may therefore determine whether a white paper is required.

MiCAR’s marketing rules are addressed to the offeror, not expressly to the finfluencer who advertises on its behalf. ESMA counts promotion by influencers among the risks that the current framework does not fully cover and has asked the European Commission for stricter rules.[16] Until then, a finfluencer’s exposure arises in other ways. If a launch does not comply with MiCAR, a paid finfluencer may be a co-perpetrator; in our view, the same test applies as in the Grinta case. Nothing in the case suggests that this threshold is reached more easily in crypto. The same circumstances do, however, occur in crypto launches: recruitment arrangements, a fee per buyer and help with purchases.

A finfluencer may also breach a rule directly. Anyone who, on a professional basis, markets crypto-assets to purchasers on behalf of the offeror may be providing a crypto-asset service that requires authorisation.[17] And anyone who voices an opinion about a crypto-asset on social media after taking a position in it, without disclosing that conflict of interest, may be engaging in market manipulation, provided the crypto-asset has been admitted to trading or admission has been requested.[18]

Fees: what does the law prohibit?

Paying a finfluencer is not prohibited as such, although the AFM regards high commissions as an alarm bell. According to the AFM, a ban on commission would have applied to Grinta had it held a licence, so it could not have paid any commission at all.[19] MiCAR contains no comparable ban for a token offeror that pays a finfluencer, although the communication must be recognisable as advertising. That a fee is lawful does not, however, answer the question whether the cooperation as a whole amounts to co-perpetration; in the Grinta case, it was precisely relevant that the fee rose with the amounts investors deposited.

What questions arise before working together?

For the business, the question is whether its own offering complies with the rules: does it hold a licence or, in the case of a token, is the offeror a legal entity with a notified and published white paper – or does an exemption apply? A further question is what role the finfluencer will actually play. The Grinta case shows that recruitment arrangements, individual contact with investors and help with sign-up or purchase carry particular weight; under MiCAR, so does the question of who announces a listing.

For the finfluencer, the question is who the offeror is and whether it holds a licence or has notified a white paper; the registers and warning lists of the AFM and ESMA are publicly available for this purpose. Their own role, the way they are paid and any personal position in the asset are also relevant. According to the AFM, a warning to followers makes little difference: the fact that Van den Brink alerted investors to the risks did not diminish her contribution.[20]

Contact

Do you have questions about where promotion ends and co-perpetration begins under Dutch law, or about the white paper requirement for a launch? Please get in touch.

[1]AFM, press release ‘€195.000 boete voor ‘finfluencer’ wegens samenwerken met illegale vermogensbeheerder Grinta Invest’ (in Dutch), 5 November 2026, www.afm.nl/nl-nl/sector/actueel/2026/nov/mr-van-den-brink; AFM, ‘Actuele stand van zaken – boete Van den Brink’ (status update, in Dutch), 8 September 2026; Rotterdam District Court, 31 August 2026, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2026:15568.

[2]AFM, press release ‘Crypto lanceren is makkelijk geworden, voldoen aan de regels niet’ (in Dutch), 6 November 2026, and the accompanying factsheet.

[3]Article 5:1(2) of the Dutch General Administrative Law Act (Algemene wet bestuursrecht, Awb).

[4]Supreme Court of the Netherlands (Hoge Raad), 2 December 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:3474, para. 3.2.2; Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal (CBb), 20 July 2017, ECLI:NL:CBB:2017:315, para. 5.3; Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State (ABRvS), 6 September 2017, ECLI:NL:RVS:2017:2394.

[5]AFM, penalty decision Van den Brink (public version), 22 May 2024, section 9.2.3; AFM, decision on objection Van den Brink, 12 November 2024, paras 154–161.

[6]Penalty decision, section 9.2.4 (p. 78); decision on objection, paras 219 and 268.

[7]Interim relief judge, Rotterdam District Court, 27 September 2024, as summarised in the decision on objection, paras 22 and 145–149; for the District Court’s ruling, see the AFM status update (note 1).

[8]Articles 6:193a(1)(b), 6:193c and 6:193g(k) of the Dutch Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek, BW).

[9]Article 6:193b(1) in conjunction with Article 6:193j(2) BW.

[10]Article 2:96(1) in conjunction with Article 1:1 of the Dutch Financial Supervision Act (Wet op het financieel toezicht, Wft) (definition of individual portfolio management).

[11]Penalty decision, sections 9.2.1–9.2.3 (pp. 71–78); decision on objection, paras 154–169.

[12]Penalty decision, section 9.2.4 (p. 78); decision on objection, para. 269.

[13]Article 4(1) and Article 8(1), (3) and (5) of Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 (MiCAR); for prospectuses, Articles 3 and 20 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1129.

[14]Article 7(1) and (2) MiCAR.

[15]Article 4(2) and (4) MiCAR; ESMA Q&A 2671 (answer provided by the European Commission, updated 21 May 2026).

[16]ESMA, ‘ESMA calls for changes to make MiCA clearer, safer and ready for emerging services’, 30 September 2026 (response to the European Commission’s consultation, ESMA75-113276571-1721).

[17]Article 3(1)(22) (‘placing of crypto-assets’) and Article 59 MiCAR; ESMA Q&A 2551 (answer provided by the European Commission, updated 18 February 2026).

[18]Article 86(1) and Article 91(3)(c) MiCAR.

[19]Penalty decision, p. 79, referring to Article 168a of the Dutch Decree on Conduct of Business Supervision of Financial Undertakings (Besluit Gedragstoezicht financiële ondernemingen Wft, BGfo).

[20]Article 109 MiCAR (ESMA register); AFM, exploratory study on finfluencers (December 2021, in Dutch), www.afm.nl/nl-nl/sector/actueel/2021/december/verkenning-finfluencers; penalty decision, p. 79.